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Introduction
Over the past twenty years, the international child rights movement
has, without a doubt, spurred the development of international law, policies, and programs for children.
As this Symposium demonstrates, the movement has been extremely
effective at putting children affected by conflict-and especially child
soldiers-on the map of public concern. Of course, the compelling nature
of their plight almost speaks for itself. If any children have a forceful claim
t Ilene Cohn is a human rights lawyer and is currently the Chief of Policy,
Information, and Resource Mobilization at the Mine Action Service of the United
Nations Department of Peacekeeping Operations. She manages a trust fund that
supports coordination of UN mine-action activities in peacekeeping and postconflict
settings, including those in Afghanistan, Burundi, Democratic Republic of Congo
("D.R.C."), Eritrea, and Sudan. She participated in drafting the UN Convention on the
Rights of the Child and was Research Director of the Project on Children and War at
Columbia University. Previously, she served as Program Officer of the Special
Representative of the Secretary General for Children and Armed Conflict. She has
conducted research on children and armed conflict in a number of countries including
Rwanda, Sri Lanka, Mozambique, El Salvador, Guatemala, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Croatia,
and the occupied Palestinian territories. She has published numerous articles, chapters,
and a book on issues concerning children in armed conflicts. The views expressed in
this Article are entirely the views of the author in her personal capacity and do not
necessarily reflect the views of the United Nations.
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for increased attention and resources, it is this group of millions on every
continent that suffers daily exposure to extreme and chronic violence,
death, torture, rape, maiming, displacement, loss of home and schooling,
separation from loved ones, and, in the case of scores of thousands, participation in war as soldiers, sometimes as young as seven, eight, and nine.
Yet in spite of stronger laws and advocacy, the situation of these children has deteriorated in important respects. The Secretary-General
reported in 2001, a decade after the 1990 World Summit for Children and
the adoption of the Convention on the Rights of the Child ("C.R.C."), 1 that
"[plerhaps more children have suffered from armed conflicts and violence
since the Summit than at any comparable period in history."'2
So what has the ascendance of child rights to the international plane
meant for the lives of children living in the midst of armed conflict and,
more specifically, for child soldiers?
The good news is the remarkably strengthened legal regime that has
developed over the past fifteen years, particularly focused on eliminating
the use of children as soldiers. In the wake of the 1977 Protocols to the
Geneva Conventions, 3 we have the C.R.C., the African Charter on the
Rights and Welfare of the Child, 4 the International Labour Organization's
Convention No. 182 on the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child
Labour, 5 and the Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the
Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict ("Optional
6
Protocol").
The Optional Protocol, which entered into force in February 2002,
strengthened the legal regime relevant to children's rights in three important respects. First, the Optional Protocol precludes compulsory recruitment of persons under the age of eighteen. Second, it obliges parties to
take all feasible measures to prevent the deployment of persons under age
eighteen to hostilities. Third, it requires parties to raise the age of voluntary enlistment to at least one year above the fifteen-year age limit, which is
the minimum threshold established by existing international law.
1. See U.N. Convention on the Rights of the Child, opened for signature Nov. 20,
1989, art. 3, 28 I.L.M. 1457.
2. See We the Children: End-Decade Review of the Follow-Up to the World Summit for
Children-Reportof the Secretary-General,U.N. GAOR, 27th Sess., para. 28, U.N. Doc. A/
S-27/3 (2001) (emphasis added).
3. Geneva Protocol I, Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12, 1949, and
Relating to the Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts, reprinted in 16
I.L.M. 1391, 1425 (1977); Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of Aug. 12,
1949, and Relating to the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts,
Dec. 12, 1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
4. African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, OAU Doc. CAB/LEG/
24.9/49 (1990), entered into force Nov. 29, 1999, available at http://www.africa-union.
org.
5. Convention Concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour, June 17, 1999, 38 I.L.M. 1207, 1208, available
at http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ipec/ratification/convention/text.htm.
6. Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the Involvement of Children in Armed Conflict, May 25, 2000, U.N. GAOR, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc.
A/RES/54/263 (2000).
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Domestic legislation prohibiting the recruitment or use of children as
soldiers has been-and is being-promulgated in a number of countries as
well. The statute of the International Criminal Court ("I.C.C."), the Rome
Statute, classifies the recruitment or use of persons under the age of fifteen
7
by armed forces or armed groups as a war crime. Child recruiters in the
Democratic Republic of the Congo ("D.R.C.") will possibly be among the
first to be prosecuted under the Rome Statute.
Country-specific ad hoc tribunals can provide further venues for
addressing violations of the norms precluding the recruitment or use of
children in armed conflicts. A case is currently pending in the Special
Court for Sierra Leone against Hinga Norman, the Chief of the Civil
Defense Forces, which recruited large numbers of young people, often
through perverted versions of traditional initiation rites.
The bad news is that our improved capacity to monitor and report on
compliance with this strengthened normative regime reveals an excessive
number of blatant violations. The Secretary-General's annual reports to
8
the Security Council on children and armed conflict and his periodic
country-specific reports to the Security Council testify to the ever-worsen9
ing situation.
In 2001, after four years of considering and resolving on the impact of
armed conflict on children, and with a note of exasperation, the Security
Council called for "a list of parties to armed conflict that recruit or use
children in violation of the international obligations applicable to them, in
situations that are on the Council's agenda ..."10 The Secretary-General's
7. See Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, U.N. Doc
A/CONF 183/9, art. 8(2)(b)(xxvi), 37 l.L.M. 999 (1998).
8. Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. SCOR, 58th
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2003/1053, revised by U.N. Doc. S/2003/1053 Corr. 1, revised by
U.N. Doc. A/58/546-S/2003/1053 Corr. 2; Report of the Secretary-General on Children
and Armed Conflict, U.N. SCOR, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2002/1299 (2002); Children
and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/
56/342-S/2001/852 (2001); Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General, U.N. SCOR, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/55/163-S/2000/712 (2000).
9. See, e.g., Report of the Secretary-Generalon COte d'lvoire, U.N. SCOR, paras. 54,
80, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2003/374 (2003) (calling for additional measures to protect
children's rights); Report of the Secretary-Generalon the UN Mission in Angola, U.N.
SCOR, paras. 35-37, 46, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2003/158 (2003) (calling for the implementation of child protection and assistance measures); Seventeenth Secretary-General
Report on the UN Mission in Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, paras. 42-43, 58th Sess., U.N.
Doc. S/2003/321 (2003), revised by U.N. Doc. S/2003/321/Corr. 1 (discussing the need
for increased child protection); Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations
OrganizationMission in the Democratic Republic of Congo, U.N. SCOR, paras. 29, 45, 47,
62, 55th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2000/30 (2000) (referring to measures necessary to protect
human and children's rights); Second Report of the Secretary-General on the United
Nations PreliminaryDeployment in the Democratic Republic of Congo, U.N. SCOR, paras.
27, 34, 39-40, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1999/1116 (1999) (discussing the need for measures to protect human rights and children's rights); Seventh Report of the SecretaryGeneral on the United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone, U.N. SCOR, paras.
20-21, 46-51, 54th Sess., U.N. Doc. S/1999/836 (1999) (reporting on the violation of
human rights in general and children's rights in particular).
10. S.C. Res. 1379, U.N. SCOR, 56th Sess., 4423rd mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1379
(2001).
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2002 report to the Security Council" includes a list of twenty-three parties
to conflicts in five countries that were in violation of their obligations
regarding the recruitment of children: Afghanistan, Liberia, D.R.C.,
Burundi, and Somalia. In addition, the body of the report contains information on illegal child recruitment by an additional seventeen parties in
eight conflicts not on the Security Council's agenda, and it was noted that
in five recently concluded conflicts high numbers of children had been
recruited and demobilization was then underway.
The Council had to take concrete steps in the face of this very clear
information, and so, the Council expressed its intention to enter into a
dialogue or support the UN in dialogues, with the parties involved in child
recruitment to "develop clear and time-bound action plans to end this practice" and called on the parties themselves to provide information regarding
steps they had taken to halt illegal child recruitment. 12 The Council urged
Member States to control the illicit trade of small arms to parties in violation of relevant international legal provisions and indicated that it would
take "appropriate steps to further address this issue ... if it deem[ed] that
insufficient progress [was] made upon the review of the next Secretary13
General's report."
About forty parties, mentioned explicitly in the 2002 report, were
monitored throughout the following year. In November 2003, the Secretary-General reported to the Council that all parties on the 2002 list continue to recruit and use child soldiers. 14 In addition, a new total of over
fifty-five parties to conflicts are named and shamed in an expanded set of
lists annexed to the report. (The revised lists include at least thirty-three
parties in six conflicts that are on the Security Council agenda, and over
twenty-two parties in nine conflicts that are not on the Council's agenda).
The Council considered the expanded lists in an open debate held onJanuary 20, 2004 and issued a resolution on April 22, 2004.15
Armed with this clear and specific information, what could the Council do? The Secretary-General's report enumerated a set of graduated measures the Council might consider taking where insufficient or no progress
was made by particular parties to conflicts, including "the imposition of
travel restrictions on leaders and their exclusion from any governance
structures and amnesty provisions, a ban on the export or supply of small
arms, a ban on military assistance, and restriction on the flow of financial
resources to the parties concerned."' 16 However, of course, by this time you
11. Report of the Secretary-Generalon Children and Armed Conflict, U.N. SCOR, 57th
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2002/1299 (2002).
12. S.C. Res. 1460, U.N. SCOR, 58th Sess., 4695th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1460

(2003).

13. See id.
14. Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. SCOR, 58th
Sess., U.N. Doc. S/2003/1053, revised by U.N. Doc. S/2003/1053 Corr. 1, revised by
U.N. Doc. A/58/546-S/2003/1053 Corr. 2.
15. S.C. Res. 1539, U.N. SCOR, 59th Sess., 4948th mtg., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1539
(2004), revised by U.N. Doc. S/Res/1539/Corr. 1 (2004).
16. Id. para. 105(g).
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will have observed a pattern: the Secretary-General provides information
and recommends steps, the Council affirms and reaffirms its commitment
to take concrete steps, but the situation for children worsens, and few of
the steps identified are, in fact, taken. 17 That is a lot of bad news!
I want to mention four tendencies in the field of child rights and
armed conflict that I believe we must address if we are to narrow the gap
between progress in the law and progress on the ground.
1. First, we avoid resolving the tensions between the human rights
impulse to strengthen norms and the humanitarian impulse to assist waraffected children.
2. Second, we pursue advocacy and humanitarian programming
without serious assessment of the political, economic, and social dynamics
driving a particular conflict.
3. Third we avoid assessing the long-term qualitative impact of the
many and varied interventions that have been mounted on behalf of waraffected children-so we don't know much about what works.
4. And finally, there is a tendency to refer to the C.R.C. as a policy
and programming tool while glossing over the divergent conceptual
approaches to children's rights and the contradictory programs and policies that result.
I.

Tendency One: The Human Rights vs. The Humanitarian Impulse

The human rights impulse has driven child rights advocates to focus
heavily on strengthening the normative protection for children in armed
conflicts, and, as I have mentioned, there has been great and measurable
progress towards this goal. On the humanitarian side of our agenda, however, progress is harder to discern; there are at least as many child soldiers
today as there were when the campaigning escalated over ten years ago.
The reasons for child soldier recruitment and enlistment are simple to
articulate: manpower shortages in armed forces and groups, the attraction
of children who are easily manipulated into fierce fighters, the lack of alternatives available to destitute children and families, the pressure that can
come from peers or influential members of the children's lives, and, for
some young people, a commitment to the objectives of the party in which
they enlist. However, when the movement was focused on achieving consensus on the text of the Optional Protocol, advocates' slogans belied any
knowledge of those complex root causes. A dedicated group of NGOs led
the campaign for an Optional Protocol with slogans calling on states to
"stop the recruitment of child soldiers" by adopting a "straight-eighteen
approach" to child soldiering-one that prohibits the voluntary or compulsory recruitment or use of anyone under age eighteen in armed forces or
groups.
17. Resolution 1539, issued on April 22, 2004 (after the Symposium), does make
specific requests for action by the Secretary-General and parties to conflicts, and does
express the intent of the Council to take concrete measures. S.C. Res. 1539, supra note
15.
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Many humanitarian agencies joined the advocacy groups in the
Optional Protocol campaign without posing the hard questions derived
from facts they knew well. Field-based organizations might well have asked
the following questions:
* What is the likelihood of achieving compliance with a new standard
when the earlier and lower domestic and international standards
are consistently violated?
* How can a new human rights legal standard reach the primary
offenders in conflict settings-non-state armed groups?
* How will the assignment of individual criminal responsibility to
recruiters stop children from volunteering or alter the social, political, and economic factors at the root of volunteerism?
For the five years of treaty negotiations on the Optional Protocol, the
movement had the ear of the international political community but failed
to raise the hard questions and generate sustained commitment to addressing the harder realities underlying the problem.
So where are we now that we have an Optional Protocol? At the end of
2003, some two years after the Optional Protocol's entry into force, sixtythree states have ratified. Only five are engaged in armed conflicts, and all
five-Afghanistan, the D.R.C., the Philippines, Sri Lanka, and Ugandahave taken the straight-eighteen approach. Is this a victory for the advocates urging adherence to stronger norms? Perhaps. However, all five of
these countries are on the Secretary-General's most recent lists of parties to
armed conflict that are in violation of obligations regarding child soldier
18
recruitment and use.
II.

Tendency Two: Advocacy in the Absence of Conflict-Specific
Analysis

Our advocacy agenda has been articulated and pursued not only with
little attention to what the humanitarian colleagues in the field know, but
also without sufficient analysis of the political, social, economic, and military dynamics of particular conflicts. This is a serious impediment to progress in concrete situations. To generate compliance with commitments
and obligations, we must get beyond slogans calling for "compliance."
As an illustration, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General
for Children and Armed Conflict ("Special Representative") has elicited
child protection commitments from parties to conflicts during his field visits. He obtained commitments to end or restrict child soldiering from the
Sudan People's Liberation Army ("S.P.L.A."), the Liberation Tigers of Tamil
18. Children and Armed Conflict: Report of the Secretary-General,U.N. GAOR, 58th
Sess., Annex 1,11, Agenda Item 113, at 20-23, U.N. Doc. A/58/546-S/2003/1053 (2003)
(stating that "factional fighting groups" in Afghanistan, various state armed forces and
nonstate actors in the D.R.C., nonstate armed groups in the Philippines and in Sri
Lanka, and both state armed forces and nonstate armed groups in Uganda "recruit or
use children in situations of armed conflict").
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Eelam ("L.T.T.E.") in Sri Lanka, the Revolutionary Forces of Colombia
("F.A.R.C."), and the government of the D.R.C. 19
Members of the child rights movement have rallied behind these commitments, calling for compliance and for reports by monitoring groups. Yet
the movement does not seem to be building bridges to the political scientists, the economists, the bankers, and the corporate actors, who either
have influence in or understanding of what is driving a particular conflict
or a particular warring party. We have been slow to build the networks
and undertake the analysis required to develop initiatives that can truly
aspire to induce specific actors to comply with their commitments and that
render noncompliance too costly for a particular armed force or group to
bear.
None of the commitments to demobilize child soldiers or refrain from
recruitment have been complied with, and all the armed forces or groups
that made commitments appear now on the Secretary-General's lists of
child soldier recruiters.
The child rights community must build partnerships with political
scientists, economists, the private sector, country analysts, and others to
conceive of actor-specific initiatives likely to compel compliance with child
protection commitments and obligations.
III. Tendency Three: Neglecting To Measure the Long-Term Impact of
Preventive or Responsive Interventions
The tendency not to assess the qualitative impact of our interventions
on behalf of war-affected children over the medium and long term is an
oversight that hampers our ability to advocate for particular programs, to
guide the flow of donor contributions, and to refer confidently to "best
practices" or "lessons learned" in programming for war-affected children.
We simply fail to stick around long enough to learn whether our programs
have made a positive difference in the lives of children. Without this
knowledge we cannot, for example, seek to enforce Articles 6 and 7 of the
Optional Protocol. Article 6 requires states parties to demobilize child
soldiers and to provide appropriate assistance for the physical and
psychosocial recovery and social reintegration of child soldiers. Article 7
requires states parties to provide technical cooperation and financial assistance to support child soldier rehabilitation programs.
What do we know about which programs work or what assistance is
"appropriate"? The international community has assisted in the demobilization of child soldiers since the late 1980s and still we see a muddle of
programs and approaches. We heard earlier in this symposium that child
soldiers seeking to demobilize recently in Sierra Leone were required to
hand in a weapon to gain access to the program. Yet all the UN policy or
19. See Promotion and Protection of the Rights of Children, U.N. GAOR, paras. 7, 45,
48, 59, 74, 75, 76, 77, 58th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/58/328 (2003); Promotion and Protection
of the Rights of Children: Protection of Children Affected by Armed Conflict, U.N. GAOR,
para. 47, 57th Sess., U.N. Doc. A/57/402 (2002).
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lessons-learned documents on child soldier demobilization stipulate that
no gun requirement should be applied to child soldiers, because commanders are unlikely to prioritize child soldier demobilization if they must
give up a weapon. Child rights organizations disagree over whether children ought to be immediately reunified with their families, when this is
possible, or housed for some period of time in interim care centers where a
range of services or training opportunities or both might be provided. And
if they should stay in interim care centers, it is not clear how long children
should be housed there. It is not clear how best to attract and assist girls
who have served as soldiers, camp followers, wives or sexual slaves of combatants, or mothers of children of combatants into the demobilization and
reintegration process. Successful reintegration is at least in part a function
of skills training that enables former combatants to be self-sustaining or to
contribute to the community after they return. Yet we have heard even in
this morning's panel about training in irrelevant vocations-those for
which no jobs will be found in the local economy-being provided to former child combatants in Sierra Leone. 20 The Optional Protocol requires
states to provide appropriate assistance; the international child rights
movement must invest far more in credible, long-term program evaluations
if we are to guide or implement such assistance.
IV.

Tendency 4: Over-Reliance on the C.R.C. To Inform Distinct
Programs and Policies

Others have stated that accountability for child recruitment is essential to the enforcement of international law prohibiting child recruitment.
We will have to wait and see whether the prosecution of child recruiters in
the I.C.C. or the Special Court for Sierra Leone has a deterrent effect, but
my fourth tendency illustrates how hard it has been for the international
child rights movement to address the accountability of the child soldiers
themselves. I am raising this aspect of the accountability issue because it is
relevant to the discussion of how best to assist children who serve as

soldiers and to foster their social reintegration. If we fail to enforce the
norms that protect children from participation in armed conflict in the
first place, we cannot then seek comfort in the possibility of merely punishing the recruiters. We must focus even greater attention and resources on
appropriatereintegration measures that will ensure the former child soldier
the chance to function as a member of his or her community. As we seek to
define what measures are appropriate, I think that the question of individual accountability for child soldiers who commit egregious crimes should
be considered as a possible component of rehabilitative interventions.
However, because the child rights movement tends to gloss over conceptual differences in the interpretation and application of basic principles
embodied in the C.R.C., it is no surprise that child rights advocates cite the
same C.R.C. provisions in support of completely opposing approaches to
20. See Kathleen Kostelny, What About the Girls?, 37 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 505; Michael
Wessells, Psychosocial Issues in Reintegrating Child Soldiers, 37 CORNELL INT'L LJ. 513.
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the question of child soldier accountability. This is well illustrated by the
debates on the involvement of children in the Special Court for Sierra
Leone.2 t

There is broad consensus that transitional justice mechanisms-truth
commissions and war crimes tribunals-should explicitly address egregious crimes involving children. The Sierra Leone Truth and Reconciliation Commission was the first to do so. Its Statute, adopted in 2000,
requires the Commission to give special attention to the experiences of
children within the armed conflict, including child perpetrators of abuses
or violations.
When the Security Council called in August 2000 for a Special Court
to try persons "who bear the greatest responsibility" for international and
domestic war crimes committed in Sierra Leone, integrants of the movement vehemently disagreed over whether the Court's jurisdiction should
extend to child soldiers who had perpetrated terrible abuses. We agreed
on the facts around the experiences of child soldiers in Sierra Leone and
we all cited the C.R.C. in support of our arguments, but the Office of the
Special Representative for Children and Armed Conflict, the Office of
Legal Affairs, and several NGOs felt that the Court's jurisdiction should
extend to those young people who joined without restraint in brutal and
wanton violence, while UNICEF, Human Rights Watch, and Save the Children entirely disagreed.
The Office of the Special Representative felt that in the particular circumstances of Sierra Leone, some children and young adults would benefit
from participation in a process that ensures accountability for one's
actions, respects the procedural guarantees appropriate in the administration of juvenile justice, and takes into account the desirability of promoting
the child's reintegration and capacity to assume a constructive role in society. The Special Court might help to ensure that the most recalcitrant and
feared young offenders, those perhaps least likely to seek programmatic
and therapeutic support, would be brought into a credible system of justice
that would result in guided, supervised access to rehabilitation and ensure
opportunities for reinsertion into productive civilian life.
UNICEF, some local NGOs, and others insisted that the threat of prosecution would undermine their efforts at child soldier rehabilitation, stigmatize the child, reduce the likelihood of community reintegration, and
place the child at increased risk of re-recruitment. Moreover, these organizations felt that prosecutions would run counter to Sierra Leone's cultural
values of healing and forgiveness.
Ultimately the Security Council adopted a Statute that extended personal jurisdiction to persons between fifteen and eighteen at the time of the
crime and includes a number of protective and therapeutic provisions to
ensure the best interests of children who appear as defendants, victims and
21. See generally Ilene Cohn, The Protection of Children and the Quest for Truth and
justice in Sierra Leone, 55 J. INT'L AFF. 1 (2001) (discussing the involvement of children
in the Special Court for Sierra Leone and the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in
Sierra Leone).
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witnesses. Rehabilitation programs are the only possible dispositions
available to the judges.
Even so, the Council expressed its ambivalence and noted that it
believes "that it is extremely unlikely that juvenile offenders will, in fact,
come before the Special Court and that other institutions, such as the
Truth and Reconciliation Commission ("T.R.C."), are better suited to
address cases involving juveniles." Very early after his appointment, the
Prosecutor stated that he did not plan to prosecute children. Of course,
virtually all former child soldiers who had committed war crimes were
adults by the time the T.R.C. and the Special Court began to function. Will
young adults in Sierra Leone be better served without resort to judicial
proceedings? Have those children and young adults who participated in
the T.R.C. proceedings benefited in some way? We do not know.
Conclusion
When you work at the policy level in the field of children and armed
conflict, it is easy to become complacent; there has been enormous progress in a relatively short period of time, particularly in terms of strengthening the legal regime. However, nothing heard this morning, in any film
or photograph, can convey what it is like to have been a child in Sierra
Leone or Mozambique during the wars, or Colombia, Liberia, D.R.C., or
Uganda today. If you go to the field and witness children living in or
affected by armed conflict, you cannot but despair. I keep waiting for the
student who is going to raise her hand and have the new perspective, the
new answer, the new question-the one who is going to leave the room and
devote her research to this complex set of issues and come up with something new. I urge you to ask hard questions about the gap between law and
reality on the ground, about the utility of stronger laws and new
approaches to enforcement, and to always consider the situation of child
soldiers within the larger context of all war-affected children.

